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One Step Forward, Two Steps Back:
The Recognized But Undefined
Federal Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege
Jaffee v. Redmond'
I. INTRODUCTION
The judicial system does not function in a vacuum; decisions by the United
States Supreme Court today affect each of us tomorrow. Citizens tailor their
behavior and relationships to conform to the needs of the judiciary, and the
judiciary in turn must sometimes tailor itself to meet the needs of citizens.
Evidentiary privileges are such an effort by the judiciary. Instead of demanding
every man's evidence, as is the general presumption,2 courts recognize the need
for some evidence to remain private.
Federal Rule of Evidence 501 governs federal evidentiary privileges
without defining or identifying specific privileges.' As a result, courts have
developed privileges on a case-by-case basis, including the recognition of a
psychotherapist-patient privilege.' As different circuits pass judgment on the
psychotherapist-patient privilege, conflict inevitably arises. Some circuits
simply reject the privilege, while others recognize the privilege but apply it
differently.' The dispute in Jaffee v. Redmond was borne of this conflict, and the
Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve it.6 However, in recognizing the
psychotherapist-patient privilege and disposing of the dispute in Jaffee v.
Redmond, the Court did little to resolve the conflict among the circuits. The
recognition of the psychotherapist-patient privilege was the necessary first step,
but leaving the privilege undefined encourages litigation and undermines the
privilege by making its application uncertain.7
I. FACTS AND HOLDING
Mary Lu Redmond, a police officer with the Village of Hoffman Estates,
Illinois,' shot and killed Ricky Allen on June 27, 1991. At trial, Redmond

1. Jaffee v. Redmond, 116 S. Ct. 1923 (1996).

2. Id at 1928.
3. See infra note 35.
4. See infra note 38 and accompanying text.
5. See infra Part III.B.

6. Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1927.
7. See infraPart V.
8. Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1925.
9. Redmond was the first officer to arrive at an apartment complex after responding
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1997
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testified that Allen, armed with a butcher knife, prepared to stab a man Allen was
chasing. ° Members of Allen's family who witnessed the shooting disputed
Redmond's account of the event, specifically denying that Allen was armed with
a weapon." In the months following the shooting, Redmond attended
approximately fifty counseling sessions with Karen Beyer, a licensed clinical
social worker employed by the Village of Hoffman Estates."
Carrie Jaffee, the administrator of Ricky Allen's estate, filed suit in the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois against
Redmond, joining federal and state claims. 3 During discovery, Jaffee sought
access to the substance of the communications between Redmond and Beyer,
including notes from their counseling sessions. 4 Respondents objected to the
discovery of the communications, claiming a psychotherapist-patient privilege."5
Acknowledging that the Federal Rules of Evidence do not contain a
psychotherapist-patient privilege, the district court stated that the standard should
be Proposed Rule of Evidence 504.6 The district court held the psychotherapistpatient privilege did not apply to communications with licensed clinical social
workers. The district court ordered Beyer and Redmond to testify as to the
substance of their communications and to disclose notes from the sessions. 8
Beyer and Redmond, however, refused to do so. 9 At the close of trial, the judge
instructed the jury that the failure to disclose the notes had no "legal
justification," and therefore, the jury could presume the notes were unfavorable

to a call describing a "fight in progress." Id.
10. Id at 1925-26. After Allen ignored Redmond's commands to drop the knife,
Redmond shot Allen, and he died shortly thereafter. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 1926.
13. Id. Jaffee alleged Redmond used excessive force on Allen, violating his
constitutional rights. In addition, Jaffee alleged Redmond caused Allen's wrongful death
under 740 ILL. CoMP. STAT. ANN. 180/1-180/2 (West 1994). Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1926.
It should be noted that Jaffee also named the Village of Hoffman Estates as a defendant,
so further references to the arguments or positions of "Respondents" or "Redmond"
include the Village of Hoffman Estates. Id. at 1925.
14. Id. at 1926. Jaffee subpoenaed Beyer to testify at a deposition and at trial.
Jaffee v. Redmond, 51 F.3d 1346, 1350 (7th Cir. 1995).
15. Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1926.
16. Jaffee v. Redmond, 51 F.3d 1346, 1351 n.5 (7th Cir. 1995); see infra note 41.
17. Jaffee, 51 F.3d at 1351 n.5.
18. Id. at 1350-51; Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1926.
19. Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1926. During depositions and trial, both Redmond and
Beyer refused to answer questions regarding the notes and claimed a failure to recall the
substance of the counseling sessions. Id.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol62/iss2/6

2

Fulkerson: Fulkerson: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back:

1997]

FEDERAL PSYCHOTHERAPIST-PATIENT PRIVILEGE

403

to Redmond." The jury found for Jaffee on both the federal and state claims. 2'
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded the action for a new trial,
holding that the psychotherapist-patient privilege protected the confidential
communications between Redmond and Beyer, and assigning error to the trial
court's jury instructions to the contrary. 2 The court stated that "reason and
experience," as called for by Federal Rule of Evidence 501,1 compelled the
recognition of a psychotherapist-patient privilege.2 The court noted that the
"privilege extends to other mental health care providers as well, including
licensed clinical social workers." The court restricted the privilege to cases
where the patient's privacy interests outweigh the evidentiary needs provided for
by disclosure of the confidential communications.26 Balancing Redmond's
privacy interests against the "evidentiary need for the disclosure" of the
communications, the court characterized the evidentiary usefulness of the
'
disclosure of the communications as "cumulative at best."27
Acknowledging the inconsistency among United States Courts of Appeals
regarding the psychotherapist privilege under Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.2" The Court
framed the question before it as whether the private and public interests served
by the recognition of a psychotherapist-patient privilege outweighed the need for
Concluding that protection of confidential
probative evidence.29
communications would serve private and public interests, the Court
characterized the evidentiary benefit of disclosure as modest.3 0
A seven-member majority 3' of the United States Supreme Court affirmed
the Seventh Circuit, rejecting only the balancing component employed by the
lower court. The Court stated that such a test would frustrate the effectiveness

20. Id.
21. Id Allen's estate was awarded $45,000 on the federal claim and $500,000 on
the state claim. Id. "
22. Id at 1926; Jaffee, 51 F.3d at 1357-58 n.18.
23. See infra note 35.
24. Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1926-27; Jaffee, 51 F.3d at 1355. The court contrasted the

inconsistent practices of several circuits in recognizing the psychotherapist-patient
privilege. Jaffee, 51 F.3d at 1354-56.

25. Id at 1358 n.19.
26. Id. at 1357.
27. Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1927; Jaffee, 51 F.3d at 1358. There were numerous
eyewitnesses to the shooting. Jaffee, 51 F.3d at 1349.
28. Jaffee, 116 S.Ct. at 1927.
29. Id. at 1928.
30. Id at 1929.
31. Justice Stevens wrote the opinion for the majority. Id. at 1925. Justice Scalia
wrote a dissent to which Chief Justice Rehnquistjoined as to Part III. Id. at 1932.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1997
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of the privilege by making its application uncertain.32 The majority held a
psychotherapist privilege precludes the compelled disclosure under Rule 501 of
confidential communications between a patient and her licensed psychotherapist,
and such privilege extends to licensed clinical social workers.33 Therefore, the
privilege protected the conversations and notes from Redmond's counseling
sessions with Karen Beyer from compelled disclosure.34
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. FederalRule ofEvidence 501 andProposedRule 504
The Federal Rules of Evidence fail to endorse or describe which privileges
federal courts should recognize. Federal Rule of Evidence 501 states "the
privilege of a witness... shall be govemed by the principles of common law as
they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason
and experience."3 In Trammel v. UnitedStates,36 the Supreme Court noted that
Congress affirmatively intended not to freeze the law of privilege through the
enactment of Rule 501."7 The Court stated that Congress meant for Rule 501 to
remain flexible, allowing for the development of the law of privilege on a caseby-case basis. 8
Before the enactment of Rule 501, Congress considered Proposed Rules of
Evidence 503-510.11 The Proposed Rules specifically identified nine

32. Id.
at 1931-32.
33. Id.
at 1931.
34. Id at 1932. The Supreme Court affirmed the Seventh Circuit, which reversed
the lower court and remanded for a new trial. Id.For Seventh Circuit's holding, see
Jaffee, 51 F.3d at 1358.
35. Federal Rule of Evidence 501 reads in full:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or
provided by Acts of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court
pursuant to statutory authority, the privilege of a witness, person, government,
State, or political subdivision thereof shall be governed by the principles of
the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States
in the light of reason and experience. However, in civil actions and
proceedings, with respect to an element of a claim or defense as to which
State law supplies the rule of decision, the privilege of a witness, person,
government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be determined in
accordance with State law.
FED. R. EVID. 501.

36. 445 U.S. 40 (1980).
37. Id.at 47.

38. Id United States v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360, 367 (1980).
39. See Advisory Committee's Notes to Proposed Rules, 56 F.R.D. 183, 235-58
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol62/iss2/6
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privileges,' including a psychotherapist-patient privilege described in Proposed
Rule 504. 1' Proposed Rule 504 extended the psychotherapist-patient privilege

(1973).
40. Id The Advisory Committee proposed a privilege for the following: required
reports (Rule 502); lawyer-client (Rule 503); psychotherapist-patient (Rule 504); spousal
(Rule 505); clergyman-penitent (Rule 506); political vote (Rule 507); trade secrets (Rule
508); state secrets (Rule 509); identity of informer (Rule 510). Id.
41. Proposed Rule 504 reads in full:
(a) Definitions.
(1) A "patient" is a person who consults or is examined or
interviewed by a psychotherapist.
(2) A "psychotherapist" is (A) a person authorized to practice
medicine in any state or nation, or reasonably believed by the
patient so to be, while engaged in the diagnosis or treatment of a
mental or emotional condition, including drug addiction, or (B) a
person licensed or certified as a psychologist under the laws of any
state or nation, while similarly engaged.
(3) A communication is "confidential" if not intended to be
disclosed to third persons other than those present to further the
interest of the patient in the consultation, examination, or
interview, or persons reasonably necessary for the transmission of
the communication, or persons who are participating in the
diagnosis and treatment under the direction of the psychotherapist,
including members of the patient's family.
(b) General rule of privilege. A patient has a privilege to refuse to disclose
and to prevent any other person from disclosing confidential communications,
made for the purposes of diagnosis or treatment of his mental or emotional
condition, including drug addiction, among himself, his psychotherapist, or
persons who are participating in the diagnosis or treatment under the direction
ofthe psychotherapist, including members of the patient's family.
(c) Who may claim the privilege. The privilege may be claimed by the
patient, by his guardian or conservator, or by the personal representative of
a deceased patient. The person who was the psychotherapist may claim the
privilege but only on behalf of the patient. His authority so to do is presumed
in the absence of evidence to the contrary.
(d) Exceptions.
(1) Proceedings for hospitalization. There is no privilege under
this rule for communications relevant to an issue in proceedings to
hospitalize the patient for mental illness, if the psychotherapist in
the course of diagnosis or treatment has determined that the patient
is in need of hospitalization.
(2) Examination by order of judge. If the judge orders an
examination of the mental or emotional condition of the patient,
communications made in the course thereof are not privileged
under this rule with respect to the particular purpose for which the
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1997
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to confidential communications made to psychiatrists and licensed or certified
psychologists.

42

Instead of adopting Proposed Rule 504 with its nine specific

general approach of Rule 501, which
privileges, Congress adopted the more
43
provides for no specific privileges.
If Congress had accepted these Proposed Rules of Evidence, then federal
courts could only recognize the nine privileges enumerated in the rules, except
as otherwise permitted by the Constitution or Acts of Congress." Though
Congress rejected the Proposed Rules for the more general language of Rule
501, courts continue to consider the Proposed Rules when applying or
developing federal privileges.45 In UnitedStates v. Gillock, the Court noted the
mere omission of a privilege from those proposed to Congress was not
dispositive as to its future recognition, but added that its omission might suggest
the privilege was not "indelibly ensconced" in our common law, and therefore
not worthy of recognition.46

examination is ordered unless the judge orders otherwise.
(3) Condition an element of claim or defense. There is no
privilege under this rule as to communications relevant to an issue
of the mental or emotional condition of the patient in any
proceeding in which he relies upon the condition as an element of
his claim or defense, or, after the patient's death, in any
proceeding in which any party relies upon the condition as an
element of his claim or defense.
Advisory Committee's Notes to Proposed Rules, 56 F.R.D. 183, 240-41 (1973).
42. Id.
43. For a description of the legislative history of the proposed Rules of Evidence
and Rule 501, see Edward J. Imwinkelried, An Hegelian Approach to Privileges Under
FederalRule ofEvidence 501: The Restrictive Thesis, the ExpansiveAntithesis, and the
ContextualSynthesis, 73 NEB. L. REV. 511, 512-23 (1994).
44. United States v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360, 367 (1980).
45. In Gillock, the Supreme Court considered the Proposed Rules of Evidence in
deciding whether to extend a privilege in criminal proceedings to the legislative acts of
state senators. Gillock, 445 U.S. at 367. The Court again considered the Proposed Rules
in Trammel v. UnitedStates, 445 U.S. 40,47 (1980), where the privilege at issue was the
husband-wife privilege and whether a spouse could testify against the other spouse
without that spouse's consent. In Lora v. Board ofEducation ofthe City ofNew York,
74 F.R.D. 565, 575 (E.D.N.Y.1977), the district court considered the language of
Proposed Rule 504 in determining the scope of the psychotherapist-patient privilege. See
also United States v. Meagher, 531 F.2d 752 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 853
(1976); In re Zuniga, 714 F.2d 632 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 483 (1983).
46. Gillock, 445 U.S. at 367-68.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol62/iss2/6
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B. Application of the Psychotherapist-PatientPrivilege
Circuits considering application of a psychotherapist-patient privilege have
generally decided in one of three ways: (1) rejected the privilege for lack of
common law foundation; 4 (2) rejected the privilege in the particular context or
circumstances of the case at bar;48 or (3) recognized the privilege.49

1. Rejection for Lack of Common Law Foundation
Several circuits rejected the existence of the psychotherapist-patient
privilege. The Fifth Circuit, in United States v. Meagher," refused to protect
communications between a defendant and his psychiatrist through recognition
of a physician-patient privilege." After citing the portion of Rule 501 stating
that the principles of common law govem federal privileges, the court concluded
that no physician-patient privilege existed at common law and refused to
recognize the privilege in federal criminal trials.5 2

47. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 867 F.2d 562, 564 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
Doe v. United States, 493 U.S. 906 (1989); United States v. Corona, 849 F.2d 562, 567
(11 th Cir. 1988), cert. denied,489 U.S. 1084 (1989); Slaken v. Porter, 737 F.2d 368 (4th
Cir. 1984), cert. denied,470 U.S. 1035 (1985); United States v. Meagher, 531 F.2d 752,
753 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 853 (1976).
48. See United States v. Burtrum, 17 F.3d 1299, 1301-02 (10th Cir. 1984) (refusing
to apply the privilege in a child sexual abuse context); Hancock v. Hobbs, 967 F.2d 462,
467 (11th Cir. 1992); Dixon v. City of Lawton, 898 F.2d 1443, 1451 (10th Cir. 1990);
United States v. Meahger, 531 F.2d 752, 753 753 (5th Cir. 1976).
49. See Jaffee v. Redmond, 51 F.3d 1346 (7th Cir. 1995); United States v.
Diamond (In re Doe), 964 F.2d 1325, 1328 (2d Cir. 1992); In re Zuniga, 714 F.2d 632,
639 (6th Cir. 1983).
50. 531 F.2d 752 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 853 (1976).
51. Id. at 753. The court analyzed the psychotherapist-patient privilege in terms
of a physician-patient privilege.
52. Meagher,531 F.2d at 753. However, the court stated that even if it recognized
the privilege, the defendant patient could not avail himself of the privilege based on the
particular facts of the case. The court cited an exception to the Proposed Rule of
Evidence 504, which disallows the privilege in trials where the patient's mental condition
is an element of his defense. Id.
The Fifth Circuit again considered the issue of a doctor-patient or psychotherapist
privilege in UnitedStates v. Moore, 970 F.2d 48 (5th Cir. 1992). The court followed
Meagher,holding that a federal doctor-patient privilege did not exist under common law.
The defendant psychiatrist argued the names of his patients and their insurance
indemnifiers should be protected by a doctor-patient privilege. After citing to Meagher,
the Fifth Circuit panel acknowledged its inability to overrule the decision of another
panel. Moore, 970 F.2d at 50.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1997
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The Fourth Circuit, in Slakan v. Porter,53 held the trial court's recognition
of a psychotherapist-patient privilege to be harmless error.54 The court noted
Federal Rule of Evidence 501 required that common law govern privileges.55
After citing to Meagher,the court then stated that "the well-settled federal rule"
is that communications with a psychotherapist are not privileged. 6
The Eleventh Circuit also followed Meagher in United States v. Corona,
concluding that no physician-patient privilege existed at common law for
criminal trials. As in Meagher,the defendant sought the privilege to protect
communications with his psychiatrist.58 A previous Eleventh Circuit decision
at common law to protect the psychiatric
had held that no such privilege existed
59
witness.
prosecution
a
of
records
The Ninth Circuit, in In re GrandJury Proceedings,'° also refused to
recognize a psychotherapist-patient privilege at common law.6 ' The court
concluded that the psychotherapist privilege developed through state statutory
enactment without common law foundations.62 The court declined to reach the
merits of the psychotherapist privilege, stating Congress must first adopt such
a privilege.63
2. Rejection of Privilege Because of Context of Case or Waiver
The Tenth Circuit refused to recognize the psychotherapist-patient privilege
because of the context in which it arose.' The court considered the recognition
of the psychotherapist-patient privilege in the context of a criminal child sexual

53. 737 F.2d 368 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. deniedsub nom, Reed v. Slaken, 470 U.S.
1035 (1985).
54. Id. at 377. The criminal defendant sought protection of the privilege for
communications with his psychologist. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. United States v. Corona, 849 F.2d 562, 566-67 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
489 U.S. 1084 (1989).
58. Id. at 563-64.
59. Unites States v. Lindstrom, 698 F.2d 1154, 1167 (lth Cir. 1983). The
Eleventh Circuit again held that no doctor-patient privilege existed at federal common
law in Hancockv.Hobbs, 967 F.2d 462, 466 (11th Cir. 1992). The court also noted the
plaintiff's mental condition was at issue in the case. Id. at 467.
60. 867 F.2d 562, 565 (9th Cir. 1989).
61. Id. The defendant claimed the psychotherapist-patient privilege for

communications with her psychiatrist. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id
64. United States v. Burtrum, 17 F.3d 1299, 1301-02 (10th Cir. 1994).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol62/iss2/6

8

1997]

Fulkerson:PSYCHOTHERAPIST-PA
Fulkerson: One Step Forward,
TwoPRIVILEGE
Steps Back:
FEDERAL
TIENT

409

abuse case.' The court of appeals affirmed the district court, which recognized
a qualified psychotherapist-patient privilege but refused to apply it after
employing the Second Circuit's balancing test." The district court concluded
that the public interest of protecting children from sexual abuse outweighed the
defendant's privacy interests and his need for medical assistance, therefore, the
court did not apply the privilege in that context. 7 The Tenth Circuit performed
a similar analysis, reviewing the case de novo.63 With the absence of a common
law psychotherapist-patient privilege and Congress' decision to exclude the
psychotherapist privilege in the Federal Rules of Evidence as a backdrop,69 the
court noted the heightened evidentiary need presented in child sexual abuse
cases." After endorsing the policy of preventing and prosecuting child abuse,
the court concluded that evidentiary need compelled the nonrecognition of the
psychotherapist-privilege in criminal child sexual abuse cases.7 1
In an earlier criminal case, the Tenth Circuit avoided deciding the issue of
whether to recognize the psychotherapist-patient privilege.72 The defendant
claimed the privilege for communications made to a nurse in a psychiatric
hospital.' The court apparently presumed the statements to the nurse would be
protected by the psychotherapist privilege, subject to waiver, if such a privilege
were recognized. 4 In a per curiam opinion, the court concluded that even if it

65. Id The opinion does not identify the psychotherapist by professional title but
referred to him only as "Mr. Joe Miller, a psychotherapist." Id at 1300. The court stated
it was only considering the privilege within the narrow context of criminal child sexual
abuse cases. Id at 1301-02.
66. Id at 1301. For the balancing test, see infra note 100 and accompanying text.
67. Burtrum, 17 F.3d at 1301.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1302.
70. Id. The court referred to the "clandestine manner" in which sexual abuse
occurs and noted that sexually abused children may have difficulty testifying. In
addition, the court acknowledged the difficulty of detecting this type of crime. Id.
71. Id.
72. United States v. Crews, 781 F.2d 826, 831 (10th Cir. 1986). The court also
avoided deciding the existence of the privilege in Dixon v. City of Lawton, 898 F.2d
1443, 1450 (10th Cir. 1990). Citing exception (3) to the Proposed Rule of Evidence 504,
see supra note 41, the court concluded that even if the privilege existed in federal court,
the privilege would not apply since the defendant's mental state was at issue in the case.
Dixon, 898 F.2d at 1450.
73. Crews, 781 F.2d at 829-30. While a patient in the psychiatric ward of a
Veteran's Hospital in Sheridan, Wyoming, the defendant told a nurse he would shoot
President Reagan if he came to Sheridan. Id at 829.
74. Id. at 831.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1997
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recognized a psychotherapist-patient privilege, the defendant waived his right to
the privilege by making the statements to a third party.7"
3. Recognition of Privilege
Two circuits recognized the existence of a psychotherapist-patient privilege
at common law prior to the Seventh Circuit's recognition in the instant case.76
The Sixth Circuit held that "reason and experience"7 mandate the recognition
of a psychotherapist-patient privilege.78 The court considered the Eleventh and
Fifth Circuits' refusal to recognize such a privilege unpersuasive in light of their
failure to distinguish between the psychotherapist-patient privilege and a
physician-patient privilege.79 Contrasting the need for a psychotherapist-patient
privilege with that of a physician-patient privilege, the Sixth Circuit quoted the
D.C. Circuit which stated that "[m]any physical ailments might be treated with
some degree of effectiveness by a doctor whom the patient did not trust, but a
psychiatrist must have his patient's confidence or he cannot help him."8 After
citing commentators advocating the recognition of a psychotherapist-patient
privilege, 8' the court concluded that effective psychotherapy was necessary to
promote "extensive" individual and societal interests and, in turn, effective
psychotherapy required confidentiality.82 The court considered an individual's
mental illness a potential barrier to his enjoyment and exercise of fundamental
freedoms, and thus, an important individual interest.u The court also recognized
a societal interest in preventing the potential danger posed to a community by a
mentally ill patient, which effective psychotherapy would counter.84
After articulating the need and legal justification for the psychotherapist
privilege, the court held the privilege should not extend to the information at
75. Id. During the Secret Service's investigation of the defendant's threat against
the President, the defendant mentioned his desire to shoot President Reagan to a Secret
Service agent. Id.
76. Jaffee v. Redmond, 51 F.3d. 1346, 1357-58 (7th Cir. 1995).
77. FED. R. EVID. 501.
78. In re Zuniga, 714 F.2d 632, 636-37, 639 (6th Cir. 1983). The court considered

the legislative history of the Federal Rules of Evidence as evidence of federal courts'
authority to recognize such a privilege. Id. at 637.
79. Id at 638. The Zuniga court characterized the psychotherapist-patient privilege
as having "unique aspects." Id.
80. Id. (citing Taylor v. United States, 222 F.2d 398, 401 (D.C. Cir. 1955)).
81. Id. (citing JACK B. WEINSTEiN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S
EVIDENCE § 504 et seq. (1975); Ralph Slovenko, Psychiatryand a Second Look at the
Medical Privilege,6 WAYNE L. REV. 175 (1960)).

82. In re Zuniga, 714 F.2d at 637-39.
83. Id. at 639.
84. Id
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol62/iss2/6
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issue before the court." In the lower court, trial judge held two psychiatrists in
civil contempt for their failure to respond to subpoenas which were the product
of a federal grand jury investigation.86 The court of appeals noted federal law
supplies the privilege since the case arose because of alleged violations of
federal criminal law.' The two psychiatrists claimed the psychotherapist-patient
privilege protected the identity of patients, dates of treatment, and length of
treatment.8 8 After endorsing and conducting a balancing-of-interests test,the
court concluded the disclosure of a patient's identity and date and length of
treatment is not comparable to the disclosure of his innermost thoughts, and
therefore, the privilege should not protect such information.89 The court made
no mention of the criminal backdrop in its analysis of whether the
psychotherapist-patient privilege should apply.'
The Second Circuit also recognized a psychotherapist-patient privilege and
endorsed a balancing-of-interests test in In re Doe.9' After acknowledging the
conflict among circuits regarding a federal psychotherapist privilege, the court
rejected the view of the Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits,' which refused to

85. Id. at 640-41.
86. Id at 634.
87. Id. at 636.
88. Id. at 640.
89. Id. The psychiatrists argued the identity of a patient should be privileged to
maintain an effective psychotherapist-patient relationship. The court acknowledged that
disclosure of the fact that a person is in treatment is not insubstantial and might cause
some persons to be hesitant to seek treatment, but concluded that the need for the
evidence outweighs this concern. However, the court stated that even if the information
were protected by the privilege, the patients themselves had already waived the privilege
through disclosing their identities to a third party, their insurance carriers. Id.
90. Id at 641. The psychiatrists also argued the disclosure invaded their patients'
right to privacy. The court disposed of this argument by balancing the "slight intrusion"
on the patients' privacy interests against the grand jury's ability to conduct an effective
and comprehensive investigation into possible violations of law. Id. at 642.
The Sixth Circuit again recognized 'the existence of a psychotherapist-patient
privilege in UnitedStates v. Snelenberger,24 F.3d 799, 802 (6th Cir. 1994). However,
the court again concluded the privilege had been waived because of disclosure to third
parties. The court also concluded the defendant violated an exception to the privilege
since the information consisted of threats against the life of a United States judge.
Finally, the court stated that the privilege must be asserted at the time of the
communications in order for the communications to be protected, which in this case, it
had not been. Id.
91. 964 F.2d 1325 (2d Cir. 1992). A witness for the government in a federal
criminal trial claimed a psychotherapist-patient privilege protected his psychiatric records
and history from disclosure. After withdrawing his consent to an in camera examination
of his psychiatric files, the district judge held Doe in civil contempt. Id. at 1327.
92. See supra notes 47 and Part III.B.
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recognize the privilege because of its lack of common law foundation.93 Citing
Trammel,94 the Second Circuit characterized the Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh
Circuits' view as contrary to Trammel's holding that Rule 501 failed to freeze
the law of privilege.9
The Second Circuit framed its analysis in terms of "reason and
experience.' ' The court reasoned that the highly personal and potentially
embarrassing information shared with a psychotherapist make confidentiality in
a psychotherapist-patient relationship more important than in a physician-patient
relationship.97 The court stated that people can not dispute that unrestrained
disclosure of information shared with a psychotherapist might discourage people
from seeking psychiatric treatment. 9 The court of appeals stated the adoption
of a psychotherapist-patient privilege by a majority of states suggested that
experience with the privilege has been favorable. 9
After recognizing the privilege, the court stated the privilege was qualified
and required balancing the evidentiary value of the information against the

93. United States v. Diamond, (In re Doe), 964 F.2d 1325, 1328 (2d Cir. 1992).
94. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980).
95. In re Doe, 964 F.2d at 1328.
96. Id.
97. Id,
98. Id
99. Id States vary greatly in their recognition and application of a psychotherapistpatient privilege. The dissent describes the various limitations of the psychotherapistpatient privilege as applied to social workers. See infra note 147.
States also differ as to whom they extend the psychotherapist privilege. The
following is a list of some professionals to whom states extend some form of
psychotherapist privilege: psychiatrists (see, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-207 (Supp.
1994)); psychologists (see, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-504 (1994)); professional
counselors (see, e.g., Mo. REV. STAT. § 337.540 (1994)); licensed clinical social workers
(see, e.g., FLA. STAT. ch. 90.503 (1995)); licensed social worker (see, e.g., COLO. REV.
STAT. § 13-90-107(g) (1995)); counselor associates (see, e.g., ALA. R. EVID., Rule 503A
(1995)); victim counselors (see, e.g., IowA CODE ANN. § 236A.1 (West 1994); see also
ALA. R. EVID. 503A (1995) (extending privilege to volunteer victim counselors);
marriage and family therapists (see, e.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 905.04 (West 1995));
psychological associates (see, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 08.86.200 (Michie 1995)); licensed
associate counselors (see, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 3013 (1995)); clinical nurse
specialists (see, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-21 (1995)); sexual assault counselors (see,
e.g., 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5945.1 (West 1990)); mental health professionals and
nurses (see, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-22-90 (Law Co-op 1991)); mental health
counselors (see, e.g., FLA. STAT. ch. 90.503 (1995)); trainees under supervision (see, e.g.,
CAL. EVID. CODE § 1010 (West 1995)); college counselors (see, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 19-13-21.2 (Michie 1995)). See also Anne D. Lamkin, Should PsychotherapistPatientPrivilegeBe Recognized?, 18 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 721, 723-25 (1995).
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party's privacy interests." Since the patient/witness initiated the criminal
investigation against the defendant and the patient/witness' credibility would be
a central issue within the trial, the court concluded that the evidentiary need
outweighed the patient's privacy interests.' The court stated that an in camera
review and a protective order preventing public revelation of the information
sufficiently avoided the "public disclosure of confidential matters."' °"n
Of the circuits considering the psychotherapist-patient privilege, the
dispositive factor varied among them. Several courts rejected the privilege for
a lack of common law foundation," but some also suggested any such privilege
would not apply in criminal trials.'0" Others rejected the privilege because of the
context in which it arose, such as in a child abuse case, 10 or held that the
defendant/witness waived any such privilege by triggering one of the proposed
exceptions to Rule 504.106 Some courts also chose not to apply the privilege to
the particular information or communications at issue after weighing the
evidentiary value of the information.' ° From this conflict, the instant case arose.
IV. INSTANT DECISION

A. Majority Opinion
In Jaffee v. Redmond, the Supreme Court considered whether federal courts
should recognize a psychotherapist-patient privilege, and whether such a
privilege, if recognized, should extend to licensed clinical social workers.' The
majority concluded sufficiently important interests exist to justify the protection

100. In re Doe, 964 F.2d at 1328.
101. Id at 1329.
102. Id.
103. See United States v. Meagher, 531 F.2d 752,753 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,429
U.S. 853 (1976); Slakan v. Porter, 737 F.2d 368, 377 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied,470
U.S. 1035 (1985); United States v. Corona, 849 F.2d 562, 567 (1 th Cir. 1988), cert.
denied,489 U.S. 1084 (1989); United States v. Lindstrom, 698 F.2d 1154, 1167 (11th
Cir. 1983); Hancock v. Hobbs, 967 F.2d 462,466 (11th Cir. 1992); and In re Grand Jury
Proceedings, 867 F.2d 562, 565 (9th Cir. 1989).
104. See United States v. Meagher, 531 F.2d 752 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,429 U.S.
853 (1976); United States v. Corona, 849 F.2d 562 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. denied,489

U.S. 1084) (1989).
105. See United States v. Burtrum, 17 F.3d 1299, 1301-02 (10th Cir. 1994).
106. See Meagher, 531 F.2d at 753; Hancock, 565 F.2d at 467; United States v.

Crews, 781 F.2d 826, 831 (10th Cir. 1986); Dixon v. City of Lawton, 898 F.2d 1443,
1450 (10th Cir. 1990); United States v. Snelenberger, 24 F.3d 799, 802 (6th Cir. 1994);
United States v. Diamond, (In re Doe), 964 F.2d 1325, 1331 (2d Cir. 1992).
107. See In re Zuniga, 714 F.2d 632 (6th Cir. 1983); In re Doe, 964 F.2d at 1329.
108. Jaffee v. Redmond, 116 S.Ct. 1923, 1928, 1931 (1996).
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of confidential communications between a psychotherapist and her patient
through the recognition of a federal psychotherapist-patient privilege. 1' 9
Furthermore, the majority concluded the privilege protected confidential
0
communications with licensed clinical social workers.
In its initial analysis, the majority considered the language of Federal Rule
of Evidence 501.111 The Court particularly noted that Rule 501 calls for
privileges to be interpreted according to common law principles in light of
reason and experience."' Citing Trammel, the Court again stated Rule 501
failed to freeze the law of privilege as it existed at that time, and the
"evolutionary development" of privileges should continue."' However, the
Court noted the general presumption that all available testimony should be
4
admissible, subject to exceptional exemptions serving a public good."
The majority then framed the question before the Court as "whether a
privilege protecting confidential communications between a psychotherapist and
her patient 'promotes sufficiently important interests to outweigh the need for
probative evidence . . . ."'"I Referencing the Judicial Conference Advisory
Committee's Notes to the Proposed Rules"' and amici curiae briefs, the Court
noted effective psychotherapy depends upon an atmosphere of confidence and
trust." 7 The Court concluded that the protection of confidential communications
served important private interests through preventing the disclosure of
embarrassing or disgraceful communications, and therefore, encouraging
individuals to seek treatment for mental or emotional disorders." 8 The Court
characterized the public interest served by the privilege as the facilitation of an
atmosphere conducive to the treatment of mental or emotional disorders,
resulting in the improved mental health of this country's citizenry." 9

109. Id at 1928-29.
110. Id at 1931.
111. Id at 1927. For the text of Federal Rule of Evidence 501, see supranote 35.
112. Jaffee, 116 S.Ct. at 1927. For the text of Federal Rule of Evidence 501, see
supra note 35.
113. Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1927-28. For the text of Federal Rule of Evidence 501,
see supranote 35.
114. Jaffee, 116 S.Ct. at 1928 (citing Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50
(1980)).
115. Id.
at 1928 (quoting Trammel, 445 U.S. at 51).
116. Advisory Committee's Notes to Proposed Rules, 56 F.R.D. 183,242 (1972).
117. Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1928-29 (citing Amici Curiae Priefs for American
Psychiatric Association et al. 14-17, and American Psychological Association 12-17.)
118. Id at 1929 (citing Amici Curiae Briefs for American Psychiatric Association
et al. 14-17, and American Psychological Association 12-17.)
119. Id. at 1929.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol62/iss2/6
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The majority then weighed the interests served by a psychotherapist
privilege against the probative value of the communications. 2 The Court
suggested the evidentiary benefit of having no privilege was modest since it is
unlikely the evidence would have come into being but for the privilege.' The
majority speculated that the absence of a privilege would chill confidential
communications between patient and psychotherapist, thus precluding the very
existence of the information sought as evidence."
Calling it an indication of "reason and experience,"'" the Court noted the
existence of some form of the psychotherapist privilege in all fifty states and the
District of Columbia." The Court stated that once a state legislature enacts a
privilege, common law can no longer create it, therefore, the Court considered
it insignificant that the privilege had been the product of legislation instead of
common law."z The majority also considered the psychotherapist privilege
proposed in Rule 504 an indication of "reason and experience," and therefore,
support for the recognition of the privilege by the Court." The Court noted that
the Senate Judiciary Committee, in declining to adopt the proposed privileges,
explicitly stated it did not disapprove of recognition of a psychotherapist
privilege. 27
After justifying the recognition of a federal psychotherapist privilege, the
majority extended the privilege to licensed clinical social workers.'28 The Court
noted that the reasons which support the recognition of a privilege for
communications with psychiatrists and psychologists, also support the
recognition of the privilege for licensed clinical social workers. 29

120. Id
121. Id.
122. Id For a discussion of the therapeutic value of the psychotherapist privilege,
see Bruce J. Winick, The Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege: A Therapeutic
JurisprudenceView, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 249 (1996).
123. Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1930 (citing Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371, 376-81
(1933) (holding that a "consistent body of policy determinations by state legislators"
reflected both reason and experience)).
124. Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1930. The Court cited statutes from all fifty states and
the District of Columbia. Id at 1930 n.ll. The Court stated the absence of a federal
privilege would frustrate the purpose of the state legislation. Id.at 1930.
125. Id For a discussion of the Court's authority to recognize novel privileges
under Federal Rule of Evidence 501, see Imwinkelried, supranote 43, at 524-42.
126. Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1930-31.
127. Id.at 1931 (citing S. REP. No. 93-1277, at 13 (1974), reprintedin 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 7051, 7059).
128. Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1931-32.
129. Id.Another factor identified by the Court as favoring the extension of the
privilege was that a social worker's clientele are typically people of lesser means who
cannot afford a psychiatrist or psychologist. Id.at 1931 (citing Amicus Curiae Brief for
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1997
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The Court affirmed the Seventh Circuit, but rejected the Seventh Circuit's
balancing component, which weighed the evidentiary need for the information
against the patient's privacy interests. 30 The Court characterized a privilege
based on such a balancing test as uncertain, stating that it would frustrate the
purpose of the privilege.'
The majority endorsed a privilege which would
allow patients to predict with a degree of certainty whether the communications
would be subject to disclosure.'32 Acknowledging that courts develop privileges
on a case-by-case basis, the Court stated "it is neither necessary nor feasible to
delineate its full contours in a way that would 'govern all conceivable future
questions in this area.""3 3
B. Dissenting Opinion

The dissent criticized the majority's justifications for extending a
psychotherapist privilege to licensed clinical social workers. Justice Scalia
stated it is unknown whether the privilege will encourage people to seek
treatment as the majority suggested, especially since the majority failed to
delineate the scope of the privilege, making its application uncertain.' 34 In
addition, Justice Scalia disagreed that the recognition of "some form of
psychotherapist privilege"' 35 by a majority of state legislatures supports the
Supreme Court's recognition of the privilege for two reasons.'36 First, he argued
a privilege created by state legislatures as opposed to one created by state courts
suggests the privilege does "not lend itself to judicial treatment."' 137 Second, if
the federal privilege is based upon the privilege recognized by the states, courts
will not know how to apply the privilege.' He stated lower courts will "barely

National Association of Social Workers et al. at 5-7).
130. Jaffee, 116 S.Ct. at 1932.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id (citing Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 386 (1981)). The court
suggested the privilege would not apply if harm to the patient or another person could
be avoided through disclosure. Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1932 n.19. This limitation is
consistent with the well-known holding of Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of
California,551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976).
134. Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1934.
135. Id. at 1929.
136. Id. at 1935-36.
137. Id. at 1936.
138. Id.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol62/iss2/6
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the states vary greatly in
have a clue as to what its content might be"' 39 since
4
their application of a psychotherapist privilege. 1
Chief Justice Rehnquist joined Justice Scalia in criticizing the majority for
4
equating licensed clinical social workers with psychiatrists and psychologists.' '
The dissent stated psychiatrists and psychologists are experts in psychotherapy,
which might justify the use of a privilege to encourage individuals to seek
42
treatment from these professionals as opposed to less qualified individuals.
The dissenting justices stated neither they nor the majority knew whether
licensed clinical social workers possess sufficient skill in psychotherapy to be the
grouped with psychiatrists and psychologists. 43 The dissent also noted that
Proposed Rule of Evidence 504 did not include licensed clinical social
workers. 44 In addition, the dissent considered important that social workers
interview people for reasons other than psychotherapy, 4 ' stating that it will be
necessary to distinguish between psychotherapeutic communications and
administrative or organizational communications in determining whether the
privilege applies.' 46 The dissent also noted states vary in their recognition of a

139. Id
140. Id. See supra note 99; see also infra note 147.
141. Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1936-37.
142. Id. at 1937.
143. Id Requirements for Missouri licensure as a licensed clinical social worker
are found in Mo. REV. STAT. § 337.615 (1994):
1. Each applicant for licensure as a clinical social worker shall furnish
evidence to the division that:
(1) The applicant has a master's degree from a college or university
program of social work accredited by the council of social work
education or a doctorate degree from a school of social work acceptable
to the committee;
(2) The applicant has twenty-four months of supervised clinical
experience acceptable to the committee, as defined by rule;
(3) The applicant is at least eighteen years of age, is of good moral
character, is a United States citizen or has status as a legal resident alien,
and has not been convicted of a felony during the ten years immediately
prior to application for licensure.
2. Any person not a resident of this state holding a valid unrevoked and
unexpired license, certificate or registration from another state or territory of
the United States having substantially the same requirements as this state for
clinical social workers may be granted a license to engage in his occupation
in this state upon application to the division accompanied by the appropriate
fee as established by the committee pursuant to section 337.612.
144. Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1936-37.
145. Id. at 1938 (citing 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 20/3(9) (West 1995)).
146. Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1938.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1997

17

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 62, Iss. 2 [1997], Art. 6
MISSOURILAWREVIEW

(Vol. 62

privilege for licensed clinical social workers. 47 In summation, the dissent stated
that a need for a privilege extending to licensed clinical social workers might
exist, but the need was not so clear, nor the contours of the privilege so evident,
that the Supreme Court should "craft" it in common law under Rule 501.41
V. COMMENT
The Court granted certiorari to the instant case because of the conflict
among the circuits regarding the psychotherapist privilege. Presumably, then,
the Court should tailor its decision to resolve as much conflict among circuits as
possible; however, the Court authored a limited opinion, which will resolve little
conflict. The Court addressed only the two narrowest questions before it:
whether the federal courts should recognize a psychotherapist privilege, and if
so, whether that privilege should apply to licensed clinical social workers.' The

147. Id at 1939-40. Citing various state statutes, the dissent concluded that forty
states extend some fonm of privilege to licensed clinical social workers, while ten states
do not extend a privilege. Of the forty states which do extend a privilege, the scope of
the privilege varies depending upon the content or context of the communication.
Examples of limitations on the privilege include when the communications pertain to
homicide, crimes inflicting injuries, any criminal act, any violations of law, a serious
harmful act, child abuse or when the communications are sought in criminal
prosecutions, or when good cause is shown. Id
Missouri privileges communications made to licensed clinical social workers
except:
(1) With the written consent of the client, or in the case of the client's death
or disability, the client's personal representative or other person authorized
to sue, or the beneficiary of an insurance policy on the client's life, health or
physical condition;
(2) When such information pertains to a criminal act;
(3) When the person is a child under the age of eighteen years and the

information acquired by the licensee indicated that the child was the victim
of a crime;
(4) When the person waives the privilege by bringing charges against the
licensee;
(5) When the licensee is called upon to testify in any court or administrative
hearings concerning matters of adoption, adult abuse, child abuse, child
neglect, or other matters pertaining to the welfare of clients of the licensee; or
(6) When the licensee is collaborating or consulting with professional
colleagues or an administrative superior on behalf of the client.

Mo. REv. STAT. § 337.606 (1994).
148. Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1940.
149. Perhaps any statements by the Court outside these two narrow questions

would have been only dictum, but dictum would nevertheless guide lower courts in their
application of the undefined federal psychotherapist privilege.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol62/iss2/6
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Court admitted the instant decision was not meant to "govern all conceivable
future questions in this area;" however, the Court's decision would probably fail
to change the previous holdings of the circuits identified as in conflict. 5 ° The
Court failed to address the issues which the circuits appear to have considered
determinative. As circuits develop the privilege on a case-by-case basis, conflict
will continue. Conflict among the circuits undermines the veryjustifications and
objectives for the privilege given by the Court. By endorsing or addressing the
decisions of the circuits, the Court could have avoided a portion of what is now
inevitable litigation.
The Court remained silent on issues which significantly impact the
application of the privilege recognized by the Court. First, it is unknown
whether the psychotherapist privilege established in Jaffee v. Redmond will
apply in criminal cases generally or in specific criminal contexts, such as child
sexual abuse. The Fifth Circuit, in United States v. Meagher, rejected the
physician-patient privilege in criminal trials because the privilege did not exist
at common law.'
Jaffee clearly requires each circuit to recognize the
psychotherapist privilege, 5 2 but fails to indicate in which contexts the privilege
should apply. While it is unclear whether the Meagher court would still refuse
to apply the privilege in the criminal context, the Eleventh Circuit, in United
States v. Corona, cited Meagher as if it stood for the proposition that federal
courts should not recognize a psychotherapist privilege in criminal trials.'
While the Fifth Circuit would recognize the psychotherapist privilege if deciding
Meaghertoday, it might still refuse to apply the privilege because of the criminal
54
context.1
In UnitedStates v. Burturm, which concerned child abuse, the Tenth Circuit
failed to recognize the psychotherapist privilege, but stated any such privilege,

150. Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1927. The Court cited several decisions after stating that
the circuits were in conflict. Id.
151. United States v. Meagher, 531 F.2d 752, 753 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,429 U.S.
853 (1976). The court also suggests that the privilege, if recognized, would not have
applied in this case because of a possible waiver. However, the court did not decide the
waiver issue because of its failure to recognize the privilege. Id.
152. For a discussion of the Court's authority to recognize novel privileges under
Rule 501, see Imwinkelried, supra note 43, at 524-42.
153. United States v. Corona, 849 F.2d 562,567 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. denied,489
U.S. 1084 (1989).
154. The Fifth Circuit might hold as it did in UnitedStates v. Lindstrom, 698 F.2d
1154, 1167 (11th Cir. 1983), that a criminal defendant's right to effectively crossexamine witnesses outweigh the witness' privacy interests in her psychiatric records.
In contrast to this holding, see UnitedStates v. Haworth, 168 F.R.D. 660 (D.N.M.
1996). The district court, applying Jaffee in a criminal context, held a defendant's right
to cross-examine was not violated by the nondisclosure of treatment records protected
by the psychotherapist privilege. Id. at 661.
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if it existed, would not apply to such cases.-' Therefore, Jaffee adds little to
Burtrwn since Burtrwn depended not upon the mere recognition of the privilege,
but upon the application of the privilege to the circumstances before the Court.
The dictum of Jaffee would probably cause the Tenth Circuit to hold just as it
did, since the Supreme Court suggested that the privilege would not apply if
disclosure could avoid harm to the patient or others. 56 The defendant in
Burtrwn disclosed the child abuse to his psychotherapist shortly after it occurred,
so the psychotherapist could have considered the children at 7risk for further
abuse, therefore warranting the disclosure of the information.1
The Supreme Court's holding protects confidential communications in the
course of psychotherapy, but it does not identify what information is included
in "confidential communications."' 58 For example, the Sixth Circuit, after
recognizing the psychotherapist privilege, held it did not apply to the identity of
patients, their dates of treatment, or their length of treatment.5 9 Jaffee held that
notes from and substance of counseling sessions are confidential
communications, and therefore protected by the privilege." 6 The holding
remains silent as to information such as the identity of patients or their dates of
treatment.'
Although the Supreme Court rejected a balancing test in the
administration of the privilege, inevitably, courts will weigh the privacy interests
of such information and decide if it is worthy of protection.'62 As In re Zuniga

155. United States v. Burtrum, 17 F.3d 1299, 1301-02 (10th Cir. 1994). The Court
did not distinguish between on-going child abuse or past child abuse.
156. Jaffee v. Redmond, 116 S. Ct. 1923, 1932 n.19 (1996). The Court did not

explicitly identify child abuse as one of the situations in which the privilege might not
apply.

157. Burtrum, 17 F.3d at 1300. Based on the policy of protecting the "vulnerable
segment of society" as articulated by the Tenth Circuit, id at 1302, the Tenth Circuit may

be prone to withhold the privilege in any child abuse context, whether the child abuse is
on-going or has ceased. Disclosing on-going child abuse appears consistent with Jaffee,
as harm might be avoided through disclosure. However, Jaffee does not foreshadow how
courts should treat past child abuse, since the disclosure of past child abuse would not
seem to divert potential harm.
158. Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1931.

159. Inre Zuniga, 714 F.2d 632, 640-41 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,464 U.S. 983
(1983).
160. Jaffee, 116 S.Ct.at 1931.
161. Id.
162. For example, see United States v. Armstrong Hansen, No. CR-96-35-GFDWM, 1997 WL 104130, (D. Mont. Feb. 28, 1997). Stating that the Supreme Court in
Jaffee "preferred" that the psychotherapist privilege be developed on a case-by-case
basis, the district court held that the murder defendant's need for disclosure of the
deceased victim's psychiatric records outweighed other interests, and therefore, the
federal psychotherapist-patient privilege did not protect the records. Id. at * 1.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol62/iss2/6
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demonstrates, reasonable argument can be made for both the protection of
patient identity and for its disclosure." Until the Supreme Court offers guidance
as to what information the privilege should protect, courts will decide the issue
on a case-by-case basis, resulting in conflict and an uncertain, inconsistent
privilege.
The Jaffee holding also leaves undecided which exceptions apply to the
privilege. Courts will probably apply the exceptions from Proposed Rule 504.11
Courts relied on the Proposed Rule for guidance in applying the privilege prior
to the Supreme Court's similar reliance in the instant decision.'
The Court
suggested the privilege would not apply if disclosure could avoid harm, which
is one of the exceptions proposed in connection with Proposed Rule 504.11
Several circuits cited the exceptions accompanying Proposed Rule 504 as
justification for not applying the privilege to the facts before them.'67
Surprisingly, the conflict among the circuits did not include the question of
which professionals the psychotherapist privilege covers. Most of the cases cited
by the Court as those in conflict involved communications with psychiatrists or
psychologists, although the Tenth Circuit seemed prepared to extend a
psychotherapist privilege to a psychiatric nurse, if the court had recognized such
a privilege. 6 ' The most difficult task faced by the federal courts and ultimately
the Supreme Court may be deciding to whom the new psychotherapist privilege
will apply. Several mental health professionals protected by a psychotherapist
privilege in their respective states are not explicitly protected by the federal
169
privilege.
The Court should extend the privilege to all those professionals practicing
psychotherapy so long as courts can apply the privilege with certainty. The
justifications given for the recognition of a psychotherapist privilege would seem

163. In re Zuniga,714 F.2d at 637-39.
164. See supra note 41.
165. Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1927-28, 1930-32.
166. See supra note 41.
167. See supranotes 45, 52, and 72; see also Sarko v. Penn-Del Directory Co., 170
F.R.D. 127, 129-30 (E.D. Pa. 1997). The court noted the Jaffee decision explicitly left
the contours of the privilege undefined so that courts could define the contours on a caseby-case basis. The court held the plaintiff waived the psychotherapist privilege by
placing her mental condition at issue in her cause of action. Id.
168. United States v. Crews, 781 F.2d 826, 830-31 (10th Cir. 1986).
169. See supra note 99. These professionals may presume communications made
to them will be protected from disclosure in federal court, but they cannot assure their
clients of such a fact until the privilege has been extended to them. If state statutes are
evidence of the need and appropriateness of a privilege and the Court seeks to further the
purposes of the state legislatures, as the Court suggests in Jaffee, many of these
professionals would seem to be protected by the new federal privilege since several states
extend a privilege to them. Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1930-3 1.
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to apply to all professionals practicing psychotherapy, regardless of their
particular professional designation or title. However, certainty may require the
Court to draw a bright line as to whom the privilege applies. For example, the
Court should apply the privilege to only those therapists licensed by their
respective states. Situations may arise in which a therapist practices
psychotherapy but is not licensed, such as trainee therapists 7 ° or therapists who
have yet to meet all of the qualifications for licensure.' 7' A bright line rule
requiring licensure before confidentiality is triggered would enable unlicensed
therapists to explain the limits of confidentiality to the patient. This example
demonstrates the uncertainty
an undefined privilege creates and the increased
72
likelihood of litigation.

In Jaffee, the Court emphasized the need for a predictable privilege,
however, the psychotherapist privilege will not be predictable until more of its
contours (especially to whom it applies) are defined. District courts have little
to guide them in their application of the privilege, and as a result, may look to
the law of the states in which they sit. For example, a court in the Eastern
District of Wisconsin considered whether the federal psychotherapist privilege
established by Jaffee applied to Alcoholics Anonymous volunteers. 7 Finding
no definition of psychotherapist in Jaffee, the District Court looked to Wisconsin
law. 74 The Court found that the two volunteers were not psychotherapists under
170. California, for example, extends a privilege to trainees under the supervision
of licensed therapists. See supra note 99.
171. For example, a Missouri appellate court refused to apply its professional
counselor privilege to a psychologist who had not received his licensure at the time of
treatment. State v. Edwards, 918 S.W.2d 841 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996). In addition, some
states apply a psychotherapist privilege if the patient reasonably believes the professional
is a therapist to whom the privilege applies. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 905.04 (West
1995).

172. See United States v. Schwensow, 942 F. Supp. 402 (E.D. Wis. 1996).
Defendant claimed the psychotherapist privilege recognized in Jaffee protected
statements made to Alcoholics Anonymous volunteers. Id. at 405. The government
argued the volunteers were not licensed counselors nor was the relationship justifying
confidentiality present. Id. at 406. The district court noted that the Supreme Court failed
to designate who was considered a "psychotherapist" for purposes of the privilege. Id.
It then stated that lower courts would determine such details on a case-by-case basis.
Ultimately, the district court held the two volunteers were not "psychotherapists." Id. at
406-08. See also United States v. Lowe, 948 F. Supp. 97,98-100 (D. Mass. 1996). The
district court stated, "Jaffee does not control a determination of whether the federal
privilege extends to communications with a rape crisis center employee or volunteer who
is not a licensed social worker or psychotherapist." The court concluded that the policies
of Jaffee call for some form of the psychotherapist privilege to be applied to
communications with a rape crisis counselor. Id.
173. Schwensow, 942 F. Supp. at 408.
174. Id. at 406.
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Wisconsin law and concluded that the two volunteers were not psychotherapists
as required for Jaffee's psychotherapist privilege.' Finally, the court concluded
the psychotherapist privilege did not protect the communications with the
volunteers.'76 If other federal district and appellate courts look to state law in
applying the privilege, as opposed to a standard federal rule of law, inevitably,
more conflict will develop.
The Supreme Court justified the recognition of a psychotherapist privilege
because it promotes two important interests: the privilege encourages
individuals to seek treatment by assuring them that their private and
embarrassing communications will not be disclosed, and it facilitates the overall
mental health of the country's citizenry by providing a trusting, confidential
atmosphere conducive to psychotherapy.' 7 If "the mere possibility of disclosure
will impede development of the confidential relationship,"' 78 such that patients
will not seek treatment without the assurance of confidentiality, and if
psychotherapy, in turn, cannot be effective without such assurance,' 79 then the
privilege must be well-defined to realize the Court's objectives. The Court
acknowledged that an uncertain privilege was essentially no privilege at all. 8
Without established contours, courts will apply the privilege inconsistently
across circuits; therefore, information protected in one circuit may be disclosed
in another.'' This results in leaving the public with an unpredictable privilege.
An unpredictable privilege without contours is worse than no privilege at
all. First, an unpredictable privilege frustrates the Court's objectives. If the
Court's suggestion is true, the unpredictable privilege will not encourage patients
to seek treatment since they do not have the assurance that their communications
will remain undisclosed. Therefore, one of the Court's objectives-encouraging
individuals to seek treatment-will remain unrealized since the possibility of
disclosure exists under an unpredictable privilege. In addition, an unpredictable
privilege, or one in which patients have little assurance of confidentiality, will

175. Id at 408.
176. Id. Even if the district court deemed the volunteer counselors to be
psychotherapists, the court would not have applied the psychotherapist privilege to the
facts before it. The court held the defendant did not reasonably believe the volunteers
were counselors and the statements at issue were not made for the purpose of treatment.
Id.
177. Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1929. See supra Part IV.A.
178. Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1928.
179. See Mark B. DeKraai & Bruce D. Sales, Privileged Communications of
Psychologists, 13 PROF. PSYCHOL. 372 (1982).
180. Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1932.
181. For example, circuits may inconsistently apply the privilege in criminal trials
or in particular criminal contexts (i.e. past child abuse); to particular communications (i.e.
identity of patients); or to particular psychotherapists (i.e. professional counselors or
psychiatric nurses).
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not facilitate the confidential relationship needed for effective psychotherapy.
Therefore, another objective of the Court will also remain unrealized since the
mental health of the country's citizenry will not improve through ineffective
psychotherapy.
Second, the judicial system loses evidence which might effectuate justice
since courts will continue to apply the privilege, albeit ineffectively. Testimonial
privileges are "in derogation of the search for truth,"' so if the Court chooses
to make an exception to the general rule of disfavoring testimonial privileges, it
should tailor the privilege so that the objectives or justifications are realized.
Otherwise, neither the judicial system, nor the witnesses, nor the parties benefit
from such an exception.

VI. CONCLUSION
In Jaffee v. Redmond, the Supreme Court recognized a federal
psychotherapist-patient privilege for the first time. In addition, the Court
extended the privilege to licensed clinical social workers, specifically protecting
notes from counseling sessions and the substance of the sessions. However, the
Court chose not to establish the contours of the privilege. Recognition of the
federal psychotherapist-patient privilege is a step in the right direction, but an
undefined privilege will frustrate the Court's justifications or objectives for the
privilege. The many questions left unanswered by the Court will cause the
privilege to be inconsistently applied. As the majority stated, a privilege which
is inconsistently applied is "little better than no privilege at all."' 83
M. BRETT FULKERSON

182. Id. at 1933 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Nixon, 445 U.S.
683, 710 (1974)).
183. Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1932.
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